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Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage
Contract
Allen M. Parkman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When marriage was a life long commitment for most
couples, the divorce statutes were of minor concern. 1 However,
this situation changed during the Twentieth Century as the
divorce rate rose dramatically. 2 Courts became more willing to
accept perjured testimony to establish the fault grounds of
adultery, desertion and cruelty. Those grounds were eventually
replaced by no-fault divorce statutes. Between 1969 and 1985,
all of the states passed no-fault divorce statutes that either
made incompatibility or irretrievable breakdown the only
grounds for divorce or added these grounds to the existing fault
grounds. The change in the grounds for divorce from fault
based to no-fault based has had broader ramifications than
were anticipated. 3 Often, no-fault divorce shifted the basis for
the dissolution of marriages from negotiated settlements based
on mutual consent, to termination at will by either party

* Regents' Professor of Management, University of New Mexico. B.A., Brown
University, 1962; Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1973; J.D.,
University of New Mexico, 1979. This paper benefitted from the comments of
Margaret Brinig. This research was funded by a summer research grant from the
Robert 0. Anderson School of Management Foundation.
1 For example, in England between 1800 and 1850 there were fewer than
two divorces per year. Griselda Rowntree & Norman H. Carrier, The Resort to
Divorce in England and Wales, 1858-1957, 11 POPULATION STUD. 188 (1958).
2 The divorce rate increased during most of the 20th Century. It rose from
less than 1.0 per 1,000 population at the turn of the century to 2.2 in 1960,
increasing rapidly to 5.2 in 1980. Since then, it has fallen back to 4.7 in 1989.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP"r OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 62 (lllth ed.
1991).
::l 8Pe generally ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT
WRONG? (1992).
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subject to legally prescribed financial and custodial
arrangements.
The initially positive response to the new grounds for
divorce has been muted as the negative repercussions of the
new grounds have been recognized. The most visible impact
has been a deterioration in the financial condition of divorced
women and their children. 4 A more subtle impact has been a
reduction in the quality of life for many women and their
families because no-fault divorce reduced the incentives for
spouses to increase their specialization during marriage. 5
While the circumstances faced by divorced women and their
children have been the basis of much consternation, the courts
and legislatures have not developed a systematic program of
reform. Few people advocate the reintroduction of fault-based
divorce, but the other solutions that have been offered for
improving the welfare of divorced women and their children
have often been ad hoc. The courts and legislatures have
attempted to help divorced women by awarding them interests
in their husbands' degrees, licenses, and professional goodwill; 6
and by compensating them for having been housewives and
mothers. 7
The fault grounds for divorce essentially required the
innocent spouse to be the plaintiff so that it was almost
impossible for spouses who wanted a divorce to win a contested
lawsuit. Usually, the divorce resulted from a negotiated
settlement that left both parties in a better position than if
they had remained married. On the other hand, no-fault
divorce reduced the negotiating power of the party who did not
want a divorce by shifting the outcome to the legally prescribed
financial and custodial obligations. These obligations, which are
similar to contract damages, underestimate the cost of divorce
to many divorced spouses and their children. Under the nofault system, a divorce can often occur when the net benefits
4 This trend was documented in LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 323 (1985); see also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce:
Informational Constraints and Private Contractmf?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986).
Because women tend to be more adversely affected by divorce, this article assumes
for simplicity that the person asking for a divorce, the divorcing spouse, is the
husband and the other party, the divorced spouse, is the wife.
5 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 100.
6 Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in
Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 459-66 ( 1987).
7 Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of PropPrty Division/Spousal Support:
Searchinf? for Solutions to the Mystery, 2::! FAM. L.Q. 2fi::!, 263 (1989).
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are negative. The laws that controlled the financial and
custodial arrangements at divorce had not been subjected to
scrutiny during the fault era because most divorces with
substantial assets were negotiated rather than litigated.
The contention of this paper is that the no-fault divorce
laws tend to produce undesirable outcomes because divorcing
spouses are not confronted with the true costs of divorce. Social
welfare would be improved by a more systematic approach to
the divorce arrangements if based on principles from contract
law. 8 While the recent change in the divorce laws has altered
the grounds for divorce, the change can also be viewed as a
shift from a marriage contract for the joint lives of the parties
with specific performance the remedy for a breach, to a contract
terminable at will subject to liquidated damages generally
prescribed by statute.
Section II of this paper discusses the shift from fault to nofault divorce. Section III addresses whether it is appropriate to
view marriage as a contract. Then, section IV analyzes the
remedies for a contract breach-damages and specific
performance. Economic analysis is used to identify the
circumstances under which these remedies should be applied.
Finally, section V uses the above analysis to argue that social
welfare would be improved by a presumption that marriage is
for the joint lives of the parties, with the remedy for a breach
being specific performance. A marriage could be dissolved at
will subject to damages when the potential costs of divorce are
likely to be low and predictable as they tend to be early in a
marriage and when there are no children.
II.

THE SHIFT FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE

For most of the history of the United States,
divorce-when permitted-was based on fault. One spouse was
required to prove that the other spouse was responsible for the
failure of the marriage based on grounds such as adultery,

8 For discussions of the reform of no.fault divorce based on contract
principles, see generally June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953
(1991); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Marjorie
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982); Jeffrey E. Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45
VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992). For a discussion of the reform of no-fault divorce based
on tort principles, see generally Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability
Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from 1brts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1991).

94

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

cruelty, or desertion. The legal grounds for divorce and the
legal standards for ithe accompanying property division,
alimony, child support and custody penalized the party who
was at fault. As divorce became more common, the likelihood
increased that the parties fabricated the evidence to establish
fault. 9 Under those circumstances, the divorce was often based
on mutual consent with the parties agreeing to their own
financial and custodial arrangements. When both parties
wanted a divorce, the couple agreed to a settlement and the
evidence necessary to establish the grounds. Then, one party
accepted the responsibility for the failure of the marriage.
This process became more complicated, however, when only
one party initially wanted a divorce, because the plaintiff in a
divorce action had to be the "innocent party." The divorcing
spouse had to have evidence of fault by her spouse or persuade
him to be the plaintiff in the divorce case. The spouse who
wanted the divorce usually had to make substantial
concessions to the other party to obtain cooperation. The spouse
who initially opposed the divorce was often the wife because of
her increased specialization in household activities during
marriage. 10 As a result, the concessions at divorce could be an
increase in the property settlement, alimony, child support and
even custody of the children. In reaching these agreements, the
parties could essentially ignore the applicable laws. In a
community property state, for example, wives were entitled by
law to one-half of the property acquired by the couple during
the marriage. Consequently, if the husband asked for a divorce,
the wife could respond by demanding more than one-half of the
community property. For the fabricated divorces under the
fault standards, the mutual consent of each spouse was far
more important than the fault-based grounds and the legal
standards for the arrangements at divorce. In essence, each

9 Donald Schiller, Note, Legislation Notes: Domestic Relations-A Survey of
Mental Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 159, 163 (1965) (citing
Neu v. Neu, 298 N.W. 318 (Mich. 1941) (parents fabricated evidence in divorce
proceeding)).
10 There often can be an asymmetry of the timing of the contributions of
men and women to marriage. The contributions of the wife can occur earlier in the
marriage than the contributions of the husband. For example, child rearing usually
occurs early in the marriage, while the benefits from additional earnings generally
occur later. This creates an incentive for the husband to divorce the wife later in
the marriage. See generally Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce. and Quasi Rents; or, 'I
Gave Him the Best Years of My Life.' 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (19R7).
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spouse had a right to specific performance of a continuation of
the marriage that could be waived-for compensation. 11
The introduction of no-fault divorce was a radical change
in these procedures. 12 California adopted the first unequivocal
no-fault divorce statute in 1969 when it established
irreconcilable differences and incurable insanity as the only
grounds for divorce. During the following sixteen years, the
other forty-nine states, Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia passed statutes that either made incompatibility or
irretrievable breakdown the only grounds for divorce or added
them to the existing fault-based grounds. In most states, nofault divorce meant that a divorce could be obtained by just one
spouse. 13 However, the divorce settlement continued to be
subject to the outdated legal standards for determining
property division, alimony, child support and custody.
The shift from fault to no-fault divorce was commonly
viewed as desirable, because the new laws removed the
hypocritical fault-based grounds. However, no-fault divorce
created its own frustrations due to the belated recognition of
the power that the fault-based grounds gave the spouse who
did not want a divorce. The no-fault grounds for divorce
dramatically reduced the negotiating power of that person. The
reduction in this negotiating power would be less important if
neither party had altered their activities due to the marriage.
However, that was usually not the case since marriage benefits
from the increased specialization of the spouses. 14 This
specialization can result in costs for at least one spouse if the
marriage is dissolved. These costs are not accurately reflected
in the legal arrangements required at divorce.

11 Specific performance was a right to the continuation of the marriage. The
courts would not normally become involved in the quality of the performance
during the marriage.
12 For data on the current status of the divorce laws, see generally Timothy
B. Walker & Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 26
FAM. L.Q. 319 (1993).
13 In a few states, mutual consent is required for a no-fault divorce. See
DANIEL SITARZ, DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1990). In New York, for example, the no-fault grounds consist of (1) living
separate and apart for one year under the terms of a separation agreement which
is in writing and signed and notarized or (2) living separate and apart for one
year under the terms of a judicial separation decree.
14 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); FRANCINE
D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK
36-41 (2d ed. 1992).
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The impact of the shift from fault to no-fault divorce can be
more clearly understood by examining the effect of a shift from
specific performance to damages as the remedy for the breach
of a contract. In the next section, the attributes of marriage
that make it similar to a contract are discussed.

III. THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
While the term, "contract," has sometimes been associated
with marriage, activities before and during marriage
traditionally have not been covered by contract law. Marriage
is created by an agreement similar to a contract, but once
solemnized it becomes a status controlled more by law than by
the preferences of the parties. Marriage also has been described
as a civil contract to subordinate the role of religious
denominations in its formation. 15 Nevertheless, the agreement
by two people to marry includes all the elements of a contract:
offer, acceptance and consideration. The offer and acceptance
are obvious. Both the law and the marriage vows impose
obligations on both parties that meet the standards for
consideration.
Marriage also involves problems similar to those addressed
by contract law. Contract law traditionally has served an
important role in limiting two dangers when exchanges occur
over time: opportunism and unforeseen contingencies. 16 A
fundamental function of contract law is to deter people from
behaving opportunistically to encourage long-term investments,
for example, and to reduce the need for people to take costly
steps to protect themselves. 17 The common law and recent
statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code deal with
unforeseen contingencies by prescribing the elements of a
commercial contract unless modified by the parties. 18
The creation of the marriage agreement is similar to the
requirements of a commercial contract, since the agreement
must be voluntary and it can be annulled if the agreement of
one party was obtained by fraud 19 or force. 20 Also, the parties

15 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOME81'JG RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1987).
16 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-126 (::ld ed. 1986).

17
18
19
20

!d.
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 446 (1982).
U.C.C. § 2-721 (1977).
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTitACTS

;~55

(:id ed. 1987).
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must be competent based on age and mental capacity to make
a socially acceptable choice. 21
Marriage is often viewed as a status rather than a contract
because of the government's role in establishing the terms of
the marriage agreement. However, government plays a major
role in determining permissible parties and subjects for most
other contracts. For example, child labor laws limit the parties
who can enter into labor contracts on the basis of age 22 and
criminal laws limit the subject of contracts on the basis of
health and public welfare. 23 Similar restrictions apply to
marriage agreements. During most of the Christian era,
marriage was an agreement that could not easily be dissolved
or altered by the parties. 24 Government regulations also limit
the rights of parties to contract when third parties are affected,
such as in zoning. 25 The marriage laws have similar
restrictions. For example, children are third party beneficiaries
of a marriage agreement, so statutes define the parent's
obligations to their children. 26 These obligations formerly
occurred only if the father and mother were married, but have
been extended to parents who are not married. 27
In summary, because a marriage agreement is similar to
other contracts, it is appropriate to consider the preferred
duration of the marital contract and the remedies for a breach.
Under fault-based divorce, each "innocent" party had a right to
the continuation of the marriage similar to the right to specific
performance under contract law. 28 However, no-fault divorce
permits a divorce at will, subject only to the financial and
custodial arrangements required by law. 29 This requirement is
similar to the remedy of liquidated damages under contract
law. 30 Much literature has developed that discusses the
attributes of specific performance and damages as alternate
remedies for the breach of contracts. 31

21
22
23
(criminal
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 213-14 (1982).
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1290 (West 1989).
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993)
violation for sale of controlled substances).
PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 14.
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 527 (1984).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-310(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-14-105 (Michie Supp. 1993).
ROBERT T. KIMBROUGH, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 92-93 (1974).
PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 112.
KIMBROUGH, supra note 28, at 196-197.
This literature is summarized in RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
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A. Remedies for Breach of a Contract
While damages are the usual remedy for the breach of a
contract, they are not the only remedy, nor is there only one
method for estimating damages. Richard Posner identifies seven remedies for the breach of a contract: the promisee's reliance loss, the expectation loss, liquidated damages, consequential damages, restitution, specific performance, and a money
penalty specified in the contract or other punitive damages. 32
The two remedies that have been available in marriage dissolution cases have been liquidated damages and specific performance.33 The desirability of these remedies for a contractual
breach varies with the nature of the contract.

1. Damages
Damages are the usual remedy for the breach of a contract
and are based on compensating the non-breaching party for his
loss. 34 It is not the policy of the law to compel the performance of contracts but only to require each party to choose
between performing and compensating the other party for any
injury resulting from a failure to perform. 35 A party to a contract who is injured by its breach is entitled to compensation
for the injury sustained and is entitled to be placed, to the
extent this can be done by money, in the same financial position he would have occupied if the contract had been performed. 36 The usual standards for damages are the expected
gain or the loss incurred due to reliance. 37 In marriage dissolution cases, the liquidated damages consist of the financial
and custodial arrangements required by law or specified by the
parties in pre-marital or post-marital contracts.

LAW 117-32 (4th ed. 1992).
32 !d. at 117.
33 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 64.
34 For a more detailed discussion of damages, see generally COMMERCIAL
DAMAGES (Charles L. Knapp ed., 1988).
35 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897).
36 KIMBROUGH, supra note 28, at 199-202.
37 FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 839-40.
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Specific performance

Specific performance is the other remedy that has been
available in marriage dissolution cases. With the fault-based
grounds for divorce, innocent spouses had a right to specific
performance of the agreement to remain married during the
joint lives of the parties. However, under contract law, specific
performance will only be ordered when damages are not an
adequate remedy, such as when damages are difficult or impossible to measure because of the lack of good substitutes for the
performance promised by the breaching party. This remedy
requires the breaching party to perform the contract or face
contempt of court. Still, specific performance is a right rather
than a requirement, because the party who has a right to specific performance can waive that right. 38 The usual incentive
for waiving the right is compensation.
The most common use of specific performance occurs when
the subject of the contract is unique, such as real estate transactions.39 However, it also can be used in suits for personal
property when the property is unique. 40 While personal services are often unique, courts have been less willing to apply specific performance to contracts for personal servicesY Nevertheless, when specific performance has been applied to personal
service contracts, courts have issued an injunction to stop the
person from providing the service elsewhere rather than performing the contracted service. 42

B.

Efficient Remedies

Contract remedies tend to create incentives for parties to
make efficient decisions --the benefits exceed the costs-- that
increase social welfare. 43 When two parties contract, it is reasonable to assume that both expect to be better off due to the
contracted transaction. However, contracts that involve future
activities can be subject to unforeseen changes. These unforeseen circumstances present the parties with the option of either
performing the contract or paying damages. If the seller's costs

38
39
40
41
42
43

PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 127.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 829-30.
ld. at 830-31.
ld. at 835-36.
ld. at 836.
POSNER, supra note 31, at 118.
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rise so that the buyer can acquire the contracted goods from
another source at a lower price than the seller's costs, society is
better off if the buyer buys from the alternate source. However,
the law requires the seller to compensate the buyer for the
difference between the contract price and the price actually
paid. 44 Meanwhile, the supplier has avoided incurring the
higher costs of production.
On the other hand, the use of specific performance as the
remedy for the breach of a contract for unique goods is also
based on a desire for efficient outcomes. 45 When a breach is
worth more to the breaching party than performance to the
victim, specific performance creates incentives for the parties to
reach a settlement that leaves them better off. Specific performance forces the parties to identify their costs and benefits
from not performing. 46 The costs associated with nonperformance when the good is unique are the value of the good to the
buyer and the expense of finding an alternative. 47 Given the
uniqueness of the particular good, these costs usually cannot be
estimated by anyone other than the parties who have incentives to make that calculation to determine a possible basis for
a negotiated settlement. 48 Specific performance does have the
disadvantage that it can increase the costs of settlement negotiations. These negotiations are a deadweight loss since the
costs incurred by one party do not confer benefits on the other.
William Bishop noted that the choice of a remedy often
turns on a trade-off between the potential cost of "excessive
breaches" when damages are awarded and of "excessive performance" when specific performance is awarded. 49 Because of
the legal requirement that damages must be proven and not
speculative, the actual damages resulting from a breach can be
underestimated. If the damages are under estimated, individuals could be induced to breach contracts when the costs of the
breaches exceed the benefits, i.e., excessive breaches. Alternatively, with specific performance one party can demand the

44 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, at 619.
45 See William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 299 (1985); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 351, 365 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE
L.J. 271, 291-92 (1979).
46 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 126-27.
47 !d. at 126.
48 !d. at 126-27.
49 Bishop, supra note 45, at 299-300.
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performance of the contract either due to spite or to an incorrect estimate of the outcome of negotiations when the net benefits are negative, i.e., excessive performance. With either remedy, the parties can avoid the legal outcomes by negotiating
their settlements. The preferred rules will be the ones that are
more likely to produce efficient outcomes with damages preferred for normal transactions and specific performance when
the subject of a contract is unique.

IV.

REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE MARRIAGE AGREEMENT

Because the decision to dissolve a marriage involves costs
and benefits, social welfare is improved when the remedies
encourage divorce only when the net benefits are positive. 50
The fault-based grounds for divorce provided the spouses with
a legal right to specific performance of the marriage agreement,
especially the right to certain standards of conduct and a continuation of the marriage. If a spouse breached the agreement
by adultery, cruelty or desertion, the innocent party could sue
for divorce. The spouse who committed the breach could not
use that act to initiate a divorce. If a spouse initiated a divorce
based on the fault grounds and relied on the courts to decide
the financial and custodial arrangements, the remedy was
liquidated damages based on the reliance interest of the innocent spouse. 51 The actual divorce arrangements based on specific performance, however, were often more generous to the divorced spouse based on private agreements that were ratified
by the courts, rather than being independent determinations by
them.
With the introduction of no-fault divorce, however, the
importance of private arrangements changed dramatically. In
most states, a spouse could get a divorce without the agreement of his or her spouse under the new no-fault laws. In contrast to the situation under the fault based grounds, the financial and custodial arrangements of no-fault based divorce were
more likely to be based on legal standards. It was unlikely that
negotiated settlements would differ dramatically from what the
parties could expect from litigation. Because of the increase in
employment and marriage opportunities for divorced women,

PARKMAN, supra note ::l, at 128.
Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage
and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. Rfifi, 870-82 (1988).
flO
fi1
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the courts under the reliance interest generally provided more
limited awards for divorced women. 52 Without any grounds for
divorce, the people who did not want a divorce were in a much
weaker position to negotiate settlements which substantially
improved the award they could expect from litigation. At divorce, a woman could expect to receive a property settlement
that returned her separate property and gave her approximately half the tangible property acquired during the marriage,
some rehabilitative support, and child support until the children became adults. These arrangements are similar to damages under contract law.
The damage remedy for a contract breach will produce
excessive and inefficient breaches when the damages are less
than the loss experienced by the non-breaching party. 53 If the
divorcing spouse is confronted with costs that are less than
those of all affected parties, then the probability increases that
a divorce will occur when the net benefits to the divorcing
spouse are negative. Under the Coase Theorem, the divorce
would not occur when the costs and benefits consist of private
goods that can be converted to common units, i.e., dollars, and
transaction costs are zero. 54 Under those circumstances, if the
costs of a choice exceeded the benefits, the parties have an
incentive to negotiate an outcome that rejects that choice. This
efficient outcome may not occur, however, because the benefits
of marriage and the costs of divorce may be public goods, valued in heterogeneous units, and the transaction costs associated with divorce can be substantial. 55
The loss experienced by the divorced spouse, especially one
who increased her specialization in household production during marriage, is often underestimated because the impact of
decisions during marriage on her income earning capacity,
human capital, is usually ignored in the financial arrangements at divorce. At marriage, individuals have already ac-

52 Some have argued that no-fault divorce was interpreted by the courts as
recognizing the equality of men and women. Therefore, it was no longer necessary
to provide substantial support to women after divorce. See WEITZMAN, supra note
4, at 857.
58 PARKMAN, supra note a, at 127.
54 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, a J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960).
55 See Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public
Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 508 (199::1); Douglas W.
Allen, Comment, Marriage and Divorce, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 679 (1992).
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quired some separate property. For many people, their most
valuable asset is their human capital. The value of this human
capital is the discounted value of earnings that reasonably can
be expected in the future net of any future investments. During
marriage, human capital can either increase or decrease. If
human capital increases, marital property is created. Alternatively, if a spouse's human capital decreases during marriage
due to decisions by the spouses, that loss is similar to a contribution of separate property to the marriage. Often a couple
decides that the family will benefit if one spouse, usually the
wife, limits her career to assume a primary role as a housewife
and mother. At divorce, this person's human capital is worth
less than if she had not limited her career. Typically, legal
standards for divorce settlements do not consider this loss in
any systematic way.
Without the limited protection provided by the fault
grounds for divorce, many people who increased their specialization during marriage, especially as housewives and mothers,
are worse off under no-fault divorce if their marriage is dissolved. Even those women who remain married may seek additional employment and education during marriage as insurance
against their costs if they are divorced. If employment and
education confer only limited benefits on their family, the other
family members may not assume many of the chores that the
women have traditionally provided at home. 56 Finally, all the
family members may be worse off because of the incentives
created for married women to pursue additional employment
and education during marriage. 57 Based on their benefits and
costs, many married women have incentives to pursue employment and education during marriage even when the net benefits to their family are negative. This additional employment
and education may not provide compensating benefits for the
family, but it does provide insurance for the married woman if
the marriage is dissolved.

56 This can often happen later in marriage because of the asymmetry of the
contributions of the spouses. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 285-87. A number of
authors have noted that the total hours worked by married women both at home
and at a job have increased over the last few decades at the same time that the
hours worked by married men have declined. See VICTOR R. FuCHS, WOMEN'S
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUAUTY 77-78 (1988); BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN
AND TIME 112 (1992).
57 Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor Force Participation
Rate of Married Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992).
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A more accurate measurement of the costs that result from
divorce, including consideration of human capital, would increase social welfare. The incorporation of human capital into
the property considered at divorce, however, would still not
recognize the subjective costs due to a divorce. Although the
knowledge that the divorcing spouse no longer wants to live
with the divorced spouse might reduce that person's attraction
to the divorcing spouse, there is still a potential loss to that
person due to the desire for a continuing relationship with that
person.
Another important source of costs for the divorced spouse
is search. 58 Both parties incurred search costs to identify each
other initially. Now, either one spouse has decided that he or
she has already found a person that he or she prefers to the
current spouse or is willing to incur additional costs searching
for a better spouse or situation. The divorced spouse must involuntarily incur the cost of searching for another mate or
living situation. Often, this cost can be very high.
Finally, the divorce may be costly to the children. 59 The
quality of life can deteriorate for children shared by two parents-living separately-compared to the conditions still possible when living with both parents. If divorce were more difficult to obtain, some parents probably could make their marriage work and, thereby, provide benefits to their children. The
parent, usually the mother, who expects custody of the children
after divorce, is more likely to recognize the costs that the
children incur because they will be less happy when they live
only with her. These relationship, search and children's costs
are difficult to calculate and, therefore, are not included in
awards at divorce. As a result, the awards at divorce tend to
underestimate the costs of divorce. When the costs of divorce
are underestimated, the probability increases that a divorce
will occur when the net benefits are negative. These divorces
reduce social welfare.

58 Marriage is the result of a search process during which the parties weigh
the benefits and the costs of additional search. See BECKER, supra note 14.
59 Unfortunately, little is known about the effect of divorce on children. See
generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1988). However, generally, children prefer an unhappy marriage to a
divorce. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP
(1980).
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A MARRIAGE CODE

Since most marriages benefit from increased investments
in specialization by the spouses, making marriage a long-term
arrangement may be necessary to protect these investments. 60
A Marriage Code similar to the Uniform Commercial Code
could be drafted that would specify the terms of the marriage
contract, subject to any modifications by the parties. The presumed duration of marriage would be the joint lives of the
parties with the usual remedy being specific performance. The
recognition of the subjective costs of divorce ignored under
current divorce laws advocates specific performance as the preferred remedy for the breach of the marriage agreement. If the
benefits of the dissolution exceed the costs, social welfare would
be improved by permitting the couple to negotiate a dissolution
of the marriage. The party who did not initiate the divorce may
no longer feel strongly attracted to her spouse. She can find a
situation just as appealing as the current marriage with a
limited amount of effort and any children would not be adversely affected by a divorce. She might, therefore, be willing to
reach a divorce agreement at a small cost to the party who
wanted the divorce. Social welfare would be improved by permitting the divorce. Alternatively, she might still be strongly
attracted to her spouse, feel that only a long and costly search
would find another comparable situation and that the children
would suffer compared to the quality of life possible if the parents stay together. Under those circumstances, she might ask
for a level of compensation that the other spouse is unwilling to
pay. In other words, the party who wants the divorce does not
value the dissolution as much as the wife values the continuation of the marriage. Then, social welfare is improved by continuing the marriage.
The definition of property should be expanded in the Code
to include all the assets owned by the parties including their
human capital. At divorce, separate property would be returned
to the parties and marital property would be divided equally
between them. To protect any children, the Code should specify
unmodifiable support standards that include any income reduction incurred by the custodial parent due to custody. With a

60 The gains from a division of labor and specialization during marriage are
discussed in BECKEH, supra note 14.
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more accurate definition of property and child support, alimony
could be limited or eliminated. With the exception of the child
support standards, the other provisions of the Code could be
modified by the parties.
Mutual consent divorce gives substantial power to spouses
who do not want a divorce. To limit abuse of this power, it may
be attractive to permit no-fault divorce when the potential costs
of divorce are likely to be low, as they tend to be early in a
marriage and when there are no children. Therefore, no-fault
divorce might be permitted during the first year of marriage or
until the wife becomes pregnant, whichever comes first.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The introduction of no-fault divorce has resulted in a deterioration in the financial condition of many divorced women
and their children and a reduction in the quality of family life.
This outcome is due to the financial arrangements under nofault divorce tending to underestimate the costs of divorce,
thereby, producing inefficient outcomes. This situation could be
improved by viewing marriage as a contract and recognizing
that a contractual remedy can improve social welfare. The
current marriage contract in most states is terminable at will
subject to financial and custodial arrangements similar to damages. Because many marriages benefit from investments by
spouses that require long-term protection, the presumption
should be that marriage is for the joint lives of the parties. The
remedy for the breach of the marriage contract should be specific performance. These changes will increase the likelihood
that the parties will divorce only when the benefits exceed the
costs.

